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ABSTRACT
Federal "No Child Left Behind" legislation, which enables students of low-performing schools to
exercise public school choice, exemplies a widespread belief that competing for students will spur
public schools to higher achievement. We investigate how the introduction of school choice in North
Carolina, via a dramatic increase in the number of charter schools across the state, affects the
performance of traditional public schools on statewide tests. We find test score gains from
competition that are robust to a variety of specifications. The introduction of charter school
competition causes an approximate one percent increase in the score, which constitutes about one
quarter of the average yearly growth.
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School choice has become one of the most contentious public policy debates in the United States.
Voters in Michigan and California rejected statewide voucher programs in 2000. Federal \No
Child Left Behind" legislation implemented in Fall 2002 mandates limited school choice. One of
the underlying assumptions motivating school choice is that introducing competition into education
will increase school quality as schools face market pressures to attract students and their associated
public funding.1
However, not only do we know little about the eect of school choice on the students who
switch schools, we know even less about the eect on students who do not exercise the option to
switch schools. In this paper, we explore the latter eect by examining the link between increased
competition for students and the quality of schools facing competition. If the introduction of school
choice, and the subsequent competition for students, encourages schools to improve quality, then
the argument supporting the expansion of school choice are strengthened.
The expansion of North Carolina's charter school system provides a natural experiment for ex-
ploring this hypothesis. In the 1996{1997 school year, North Carolina had no charter schools. Just
three years later nearly 100 charter schools were operating in North Carolina. This expansion of
charter schools, which provides parents with more schooling options, is expected to spur improve-
ment in the traditional public schools which have long dominated public and secondary education.
We examine the expansion of the charter school system, both temporally and geographically, in
order to estimate the eect of school choice on the performance of public schools.
Charter schools are public schools that are founded by community leaders and parents.2 Charter
schools receive public funds but are allowed greater curricular exibility than traditional public
schools.3 Across the United States, the charter school system has expanded rapidly. According
to the National Center for Education Statistics, approximately 2,000 charter schools operated in
2000{2001 (Homan, 2002). The enrollment mechanism varies by state, but typically students can
disenroll from the assigned traditional school and enroll in a charter school.
1For example, see Friedman (1962) for a discussion.
2For more on charter schools, see Geske, Davis and Hingle (1997).
3We dene \traditional school" as the public school that is managed by the local education agency, in contrast
with the \charter school". The term \traditional" is not meant to suggest that charter schools necessarily adopt an
atypical curriculum.
1Two justications are commonly oered for charter schools. The rst is that increased curric-
ular exibility allows charter schools to adapt their curricula to particular needs of their student
populations. For example, some charters specialize in the arts, while others specialize in vocational
education. More common are charters that focus on traditional subjects, but use an atypical cur-
riculum. The potential benet from these schools, however, is limited to students who enroll in the
charter school.4
The second justication is that the infusion of competition into the public education system
provides an incentive for traditional schools to increase quality. This follows the standard economic
argument that competition forces rms to increase quality and/or lower price. When a charter
school opens, the traditional school, which previously held a monopoly on public education in a
feeder district, faces the prospect of losing students to the new competitor. To the extent that the
school's agent (ostensibly a principal) experiences disutility from a decline in enrollment, this might
lead to an increase in the traditional school's quality in order to retain students. Such disutility
might result from a decline in stature of the school in the community, lessened prospects for career
advancement, a loss of personnel and budget provided by the funding agency, or a decrease in job
satisfaction. Depending on the form of the public education cost function, a decrease in enrollment
might also increase average costs and lower the quality of instruction for the remaining students.
This second eect is particularly interesting from a policy perspective. The idea that empow-
ered parents can \vote with their feet" (Tiebout, 1956) is the primary tenet behind other current
experiments in school choice. For example, while some parents desire vouchers in order to switch
their children from the assigned traditional public school to a private school, others are likely inter-
ested in vouchers so they can credibly threaten to disenroll the children from the traditional school
unless improvements are made. By exploring the degree to which the availability of charter schools
aects the quality of competing traditional schools, we add to the debate on school choice.
Current evidence that links school choice and quality is limited, but typically nds some quality
gains to choice. Hoxby (2000a) looks at intra-district choice, nding some benets to competi-
tion. Blair and Staley (1995) report that test performance in a school district is correlated with
performance in neighboring districts, though their results may be partially explained by spatial
4There may be peer eects on students remaining in traditional schools as charter-bound students disenroll (e.g.
Hoxby, 2000b), but these eects are likely small relative to the benets received by charter school enrollees. Further-
more, such peer eects may be negative depending on the types of students disenrolling.
2correlation. Borland and Howsen (1992) nd weak evidence that lower school district concentra-
tion leads to higher achievement. Bettinger (1999) nds no gains to competition from Michigan
charter schools. Rouse (1998) nds that the Milwaukee voucher program increased student achieve-
ment. Hoxby (2002) examines the eects of vouchers in Milwaukee and charter schools in Michigan
and Arizona and nds productivity and achievement gains from increased choice. Cullen, Jacob,
and Levitt (2000) use Chicago Public School data to analyze the eect of choice on the students
who change schools, obtaining mixed results. Finally, Greene and Forster (2002) report gains to
competition as measured by an index of the distance between traditional schools and charters.
We contribute to the school choice literature by exploiting an expansion of the North Carolina
charter school system in combination with extensive school achievement data. Our hypothesis
is that the expansion of the charter school system has encouraged traditional schools to increase
achievement by oering greater school choice to North Carolina parents. Our results generally sup-
port this hypothesis. In particular, we nd that the closer a charter school is to a traditional school
(and hence the greater the competition facing the traditional school), the greater the achievement
gains. These results persist across a wide set of models. The gain is not inconsequential, since the
average achievement increase due to charter school competition (1 percent) is about one fourth of
the average yearly increase.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model and
section 3 presents the econometric model. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the data and the estimation
results. Section 6 summarizes the main ndings, addresses limitations, and oers suggestions for
future research.
2 Conceptual model
Consider an agent (e.g. a school principal) who manages the sole traditional public school in the
feeder district. Parents can choose for their children to attend either the traditional school or a
competing charter school that has a price of attendance p.5 Assume that the utility function of the
agent,
5For linguistic convenience, we adopt the convention that the parents choose the school that their children attend.
This is reasonable given that our data consist of third through eighth graders.
3U(M;e) , (1)
has two components, eort exerted by the agent (e) and membership of the school (M). M is a
demand function dened as
M(q(e);p) , (2)
where q is the quality of the traditional school.
We assume that U is decreasing in e, increasing in M, and concave in each. Since M is a
demand function, it is increasing in both the price of a substitute good (p), and the quality (q).
The agent can increase the quality of the school by exerting more eort, perhaps through more
sta meetings, greater vigilance of instruction quality, or implementation of after-school programs,
although the second derivative of q(e) is negative.
The agent chooses e to maximize
U(e;M(q(e);p)). (3)
The rst order condition is
Ue + UMMqqe = 0 (4)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Equation 4 indicates that at the optimal eort level the
marginal disutility from eort equals the marginal utility stemming from the increased membership
that results from the positive impact of additional eort on school quality.
We examine the impact of increased charter school availability on traditional school test scores,
or in terms of the model, the eect of decreases in p on q. Since
@q
@e > 0, the sign of
@q
@p is the same
as the sign of @e
@p . Using the implicit function theorem, it can be shown that a sucient condition
for @e
@p < 0 is
@2U
@e@M
< 0 . (5)
4That is, a decrease in cost of charter school attendance increases the quality of the competing
traditional school if the marginal disutility of eort is increasing in membership or, symmetrically,
the marginal utility of membership is decreasing in eort. This condition implies that as enroll-
ment in the traditional school increases, the agent has less incentive to exert substantial eort.
Alternatively, at high levels of eort, increases in membership provide little benet.
We dene the traditional school's competitor as the nearest charter school and examine whether
the distance to the competitor inuences the performance of the traditional school.6 Since charter
schools charge no tuition, a major component of the price of attending the competitor is travel
cost. Travel cost, in terms of lost wages, depreciation of the transport vehicle, and lost leisure time,
increases as distance from the traditional school increases, holding other factors constant. Thus,
we use the distance to the nearest charter school as a proxy for travel cost | and the price of
attendance p | to examine whether charter school competition increases traditional school quality.
Private schools and neighboring traditional school districts also compete with traditional schools.
We ignore these two additional sources of competition because the cost of switching to either is sub-
stantially higher than that of switching to a charter school. Unlike traditional and charter schools,
tuition at private schools is considerable. Meanwhile, switching between neighboring traditional
school districts typically requires the family to move its residence. Thus, threats to transfer to a
nearby charter school are more credible than threats to transfer to a neighboring traditional or
private school.
3 Econometric Model
The primary eect of interest is how a change in the price of charter school attendance, as repre-
sented by distance to the nearest charter school, aects the quality of the traditional school. Our
measure of quality is the achievement of the students in the traditional school as measured by
end-of-year test scores. We therefore estimate the following test score production function:
6Our use of distance as the relevant cost component follows originally from Hotelling (1949), who proposed that
travel cost, which is a function of distance, is an important determinant of the demand for recreational goods. Smith
and Kaoru (1990) perform a meta-analysis of the literature on the eects of travel cost in the recreational economics
literature. In the education literature, distance has been extensively used as a determinant for school attendance.
For example, in a study of school choice in Pakistan, Alderman, Orazem, and Paterno (2001) nd that changes of
only one kilometer in distance to the nearest school have a substantial eect on the probability of attending that
school. Collins and Snell (2000) nd (in UK data) that students living farther from a school were less likely to attend
it. Goldring and Hausman (1999) nd that distance was an important consideration for Saint Louis parents.
5SCOREit = SCOREit 1 + DISTANCEit + Xit + i + "it (6)
This \value-added" specication for test score production is commonly used in the literature.
Specically, the lagged test score accounts for underlying student quality. We include observed
time-specic characteristics of the school Xit that inuence achievement. Error components i,
which is time invariant, and "it, which is transitory, are unobserved. The parameter of interest is
, the eect of price on quality.
We estimate three types of models. First, we estimate cross-sectional models by year. Our data,
however, are longitudinal, and cross-sectional models yield inecient estimates by disregarding
potentially important information. To account for the panel nature of the data and to test for
robustness, we estimate panel models using both the Arellano-Bond (1991) procedure for dynamic
panel models and a semi-parametric maximum likelihood estimator.
Because the lagged SCORE term and the i term (a school-specic time-invariant component)
are correlated, OLS estimation will be inconsistent. We therefore estimate the cross-sectional
models by standard instrumental variables techniques. The Arellano-Bond (1991) procedure is an
instrumental variables method that accounts for the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in
a longitudinal framework.
The maximum likelihood estimates are consistent if the i term is integrated out. That is, the








where the second term is the initial condition. Rather than specify the distribution of the i
and integrate over the assumed density, we use a semi-parametric method originally suggested for
survival analysis by Heckman and Singer (1984) and subsequently generalized to a wider class of
models by various researchers including Angeles, Guilkey and Mroz (1998), Cutler (1995), Goldman,
Leibowitz, and Buchanan (1998), and Taber (2000). This class of models | known as discrete factor
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!
(8)
where m = Pr( =  m). The  m and m are estimated within the model.7
4 Data
The data for this study come primarily from three sources. School test performance data are
provided by the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI). Beginning in 1996{
1997, NCDPI has tested students at the end of each school year as part of its \ABC's of Public
Education" program. These end-of-year tests are taken statewide by all students in grades three
through twelve. Tests vary by grade. We analyze outcomes of math, reading, and writing tests
taken by students in grades three through eight. The measure we use is the school-level \perfor-
mance composite", which NCDPI computes as the percentage of tests taken that meet a NCDPI
dened achievement standard. The performance composite is a combination of the math, reading,
and writing scores, so that the performance composite reects NCDPI's estimate of the percent of
students with satisfactory achievement. Since the performance composite is widely reported and
disseminated by the media, traditional schools have added market pressure to improve test perfor-
mance. Although parents would likely suspect which schools are \good" and \bad" in the absence
of test results, publication of the NCDPI scores provides parents with quantitative information on
which they can form their judgements if they choose.
The use of test scores to measure of school quality is potentially contentious. Researchers have
used various alternative measures of school quality, such as labor market outcomes (e.g., Card and
Krueger, 1992) and further educational attainment (e.g. Krueger, 1999; Betts, 2001) of attendees.
Hanushek (1979) argues that test scores proxy school quality relatively well in earlier grades. Hence,
this paper examines only elementary and middle school test scores.
Our price variable is the distance from the traditional school to the nearest charter school. To
generate this measure, we map the latitude and longitude of traditional schools and charter schools
7For more details regarding this estimation method, consult Angeles, Guilkey, and Mroz (1998).
7throughout the state, identify the closest charter school to each traditional school, and compute
the aerial distance between the two.8 The distance measure could not be computed for schools
with addresses that were not mappable (about 100 schools, or seven percent of the sample). These
schools listed addresses with rural routes or streets that could not be located. These schools, which
are disproportionately rural, are thus excluded from the analysis.
The third major data source is the National Center for Education Statistics' Common Core of
Data (CCD). The CCD contains measures of the student population, including racial and ethnic
composition, the percentage qualifying for free lunch, and the total enrollment of the school. These
les also contain information on personnel counts, allowing us to use the ratio of pupils to full-time
equivalent instruction personnel to proxy for class size. Although Hanushek et al (1996) nd that
the use of school-level measures may lead to biased estimators, neither the CCD nor NCDPI provide
class size measures.
To balance our panel, we exclude schools with missing test performance measures for any
year during our sample period which spans from 1996{1997 to 1999{2000. This assumes that the
sample attrition process is random. Schools with missing test performance data include those that
did not report ABC results in a year (due to insucient student testing or some other technical
reason), began operating after 1996{1997, or ceased operations before 1999{2000. We also drop
schools located in three North Carolina Outer Banks counties with substantial water boundaries,
making the straight-line distance a poor proxy for actual travel time to and from these localities.
One additional factor that might aect test performance is the degree of urbanization. Thus we
calculate the county's population density and include it as a regressor.
5 Results
5.1 Summary statistics
We begin by describing the number of charter schools in North Carolina. Table 1 shows that the
charter school system has grown substantially during the sample period. In 1996{1997, there were
no charter schools. The following year, there were 28 charter schools in operation. By 1999{2000,
8Bettinger (1999) uses the number of charter schools within a given radius as a measure of charter school compe-
tition.
8there were 74. Despite the rapid growth in the charter school system, charter school attendees
comprise just over one percent of public school enrollment in 2000-2001.
Table 2 presents various measures of distance to the nearest charter school for the sample years.
As the number of charter schools nearly tripled, the average distance to the closest charter school
has fallen by about one-third, from 32 km in 1997{1998 to 21 km in 1999{2000. As an alternative
to distance (or the log of distance in some regressions), we calculate ve indicator variables that
equal 1 if and only if the traditional school is within a given number of kilometers (5, 10, 15, 20,
and 25 kilometers) of the nearest charter. For example, the distance to the nearest charter school is
less than ve kilometers for about 9 percent of traditional schools in 1997{1998, but over twice as
many schools were within 5 kilometers in 1999{2000. We also calcaulate an indicator for whether
a charter school is operating in the same county as the traditional school, the mean of which also
increases over time.
The inuence of a nearby charter school on traditional school performance depends, in part,
on the credibility of students' threats to switch to the charter. Threats are more credible as
the distances between the schools decreases. In order to frame the distances over which charter
schools might aect traditional school enrollment, we examine separate data on approximately
2,000 North Carolina students in grades three through eight who switch from a traditional school
to a charter school. The median distance between the two schools for these switchers is about 6
kilometers, with a 95th percentile of around 22 kilometers. Although these data represent actual
rather than potential migration patterns, these statistics suggest that eects of charter schools
beyond 25 kilometers from a traditional school should be small.9
Figure 1 maps North Carolina counties and their charter school status during the three sample
years. It is evident that counties in metropolitan statistical areas are more likely to contain a charter
school. There is also considerable variation over time with many new charter schools opening each
year. Figure 2 tabulates distance from the traditional school to the nearest charter by whether any
charter was operating in the same county as the traditional school in 1999. For example, ninety
percent of schools in counties with a charter school are located within 20 km of the charter.
Table 3 summarizes the mean performance composite among traditional schools and changes
9We also spoke with a charter school administrator in North Carolina who indicates that his school draws students
primarily from four nearby schools located approximately 2, 5, 6, and 9 km from the charter.
9from the previous year. The mean performance composite increased over time from roughly 67 in
1996{97 to 75 in 1999{2000. The yearly increase fell over time, though, from around 4 in 1997{98
to just over 1 in 1999{2000.
Table 4 presents sample summary statistics. In the typical school, approximately three percent
of students are Hispanic, thirty-two percent are African-American, and thirty-eight percent are
eligible for free lunch. On average schools have 15 students per faculty member, an enrollment of
566 students, and a performance composite of about 72.
5.2 Cross-section regressions
We begin by exploring cross-section regression models. Beyond the potential inconsistency from
the use of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor, this rst econometric specication has two
possible limitations. First, the lagged performance composite score proxying for ability is measured
with error, because the score is an imperfect measure of underlying student quality. charter school
placement, and thus distance from the traditional school to the nearest charter school, may be
a function of traditional school quality. For example, charters may locate in areas with above-
average student quality in order to \skim" the high-performing students and appear to be very
eective. In this situation, a cross-section regression would indicate a benecial eect of charter
school competition because the average traditional school facing competition has higher quality
students than the average school not facing competition. Alternatively, charters may originate in
locales in which parents are dissatised with the performance of the traditional school. If students
in these areas have below-average achievement, competition would appear detrimental to traditional
school performance because the average school facing competition has lower quality students than
the average school not facing competition.
We examine the possibility that charter schools are endogenously placed in cross-section regres-
sions in which distance is instrumented by county-level factors thought to inuence the location
of charter schools in North Carolina.10 Over all distance variable specications, Hausman tests of
exogeneity are insignicant, implying that the distance measure can be treated as exogenous. Bet-
tinger (1999) used distance to the nearest public university for which the governor (a charter school
10Instuments include county-level factors such as the proportion of students African-American, the average perfor-
mance composite, and the total number of students. The instrument set passes tests of both power and overidenti-
cation at conventional levels.
10proponent) appoints the board as an instrument for charter school competition, motivated by the
fact that in Michigan universities issue the charters for charter schools. Since school systems issue
the charters in North Carolina, there is little theoretical justication for using a similar instrument
in our regressions.11 Moreover, North Carolina charter schools are quite heterogeneous in focus and
history, including some schools that converted from traditional public or private administration.
Thus, there is no single model that explains how charter schools are instituted in North Carolina.
Therefore, the remainder of the paper assumes that charter school placement, and thus distance to
the nearest charter school, is exogneous.
The cross-sectional models estimate the eect of ve dierent distance measures. Two of these
are parametric: the number of kilometers to the nearest charter school and the log of this measure.
We also explore three binary indicators. Two of these signal whether the traditional school is within
10 or 20 km, respectively, of the nearest charter school.12 The third is an indicator for whether
a charter school is located in the county that year. Since our hypothesis predicts that traditional
school quality will decrease as the distance to the nearest charter increases, the predicted coecients
are negative for parametric measures and positive for the indicators.
Table (5) summarizes cross-sectional regression results. A separate regression is estimated for
each of the three sample years and for each of the ve distance measures, resulting in fteen separate
models. Eight of the fteen distance estimates are signicantly dierent from zero and all have the
expected sign. In the rst and third year, all three distance indicators are signicant. In 1997{98,
the magnitude of the charter eect is invariant to whether the charter is within 10 or 20 km, while
in 1999{2000, the magnitude is twice as great for the shorter distance. This pattern, as well as
the larger coecient for \charter in county" in 1997{98, is consistent with the dramatic growth of
the charter system during these two years: in 1999{2000 more traditional schools were likely to
have charters within the county and charters within 20 km. In these 2 years, the only parametric
measure that is signicant is the log of distance in 1999{2000. The results for 1998{99 are the
opposite, since distance is signicant but no other measures are.13
11We estimated IV models analogous to those of Bettinger (1999). Although distance to the nearest public university
passed instrument validity tests, Hausman tests failed to reject its exogeneity in the test performance equation.
12Similar results are found for the ve, fteen, and twenty-ve kilometer indicators.
13Schools may experience large shifts in enrollment if nearby schools open or close. To test for robustness, we run
the IV models on the subsample of schools with yearly changes of enrollment of less than ve percent. The results
are, in general, more statistically and economically signicant.
11The relevant policy question, however, is what happens to the quality of traditional schools after
the onset of charter school competition. We explore this question, most appropriately addressed
from a longitudinal perspective, in the next two subsections.
5.3 IV panel models
Table 6 presents results from the Arellano-Bond (1991) panel IV models. Again, we instrument
the once-lagged score with the twice-lagged score to account for measurement error. Model (1)
uses the natural log of the kilometers from the nearest charter school to account for the degree
of competition. The estimated elasticity of Model (1) is .003 which is statistically insignicant.
This elasticity might seem small at rst blush, but recall that it is conditional on the previous year
performance composite. The average performance composite gain in 1999{2000, for example, is
1.11 points (1.7 percent), so (ignoring statistical signicance) halving the distance to the nearest
charter would bring about an increase of just less than ten percent of the average achievement gain.
Models (2) through (6) control for charter school competition using indicators for whether a
charter school was operating within a given distance. In all of these models, charter school competi-
tion raises the performance composite of the traditional school. The eect is signicant at standard
signicance levels for all indicators except within ve kilometers, and is nearly signicant for that
indicator. In all ve cases, charter school competition increases traditional school performance
by about one percent. This represents more than one-half of the average achievement gain of 1.7
percent in 1999{2000.
The magnitudes of these eects are roughly two to ve times as large as that of decreasing
the student-faculty ratio by 1. Introducing school choice seems like a promising alternative to
lowering class size, which has received substantially more public policy attention, and is likely
more cost-eective in the context of charter schools. Since state funding follows the student, an
increase in the charter school system implies no increase in spending.14 For instance, in 2002, the
North Carolina Governor's Oce proposed a $US 26 million increase in the state budget to reduce
average class size by roughly 1.8 students. Ignoring statistical signicance, this would increase
scores by approximately .36 percent, about one-third of the increase attributable to the opening of
14Technically, the state may even save money from charter school expansion, since, for example, the state provides
no capital funding for charter schools.
12a neighboring charter school.
Model (7) uses an indicator for whether a charter school is operating in the same county as the
traditional school. The point estimate on this parameter is again positive and similar in magnitude
to the other indicators, although it is marginally insignicant.
5.4 Maximum likelihood models
Finally, we specify the maximum likelihood model of Equation 8, which accounts for the time-
invariant unobserved characteristics as well as the initial condition. The endogeneity is incorporated
by points of support| one point of support assumes that there is no time-invariant heterogeneity.
As the points of support increase, the model estimates more support points of the heterogeneity.
If heterogeneity exists, then the one point of support model will yield inconsistent results. Table
7 shows the results, which are similar to those obtained in the cross-sectional and panel IV regres-
sions.15 Two distinct patterns emerge. First, the estimated eect of competition falls as distance
increases, as expected, with just one exception: the estimated eect of being 15 km is smaller than
that of the estimated eect of begin within 20 km of a charter. Traditional schools within 5 kilome-
ters of a charter experience a one percent achievement gain; traditional schools within 25 kilometers
experience only about half of that gain. Second, unobserved heterogeneity has very little impact
on the distance indicator coecient estimates. Although specication tests reject the parsimonious
one point model (which assumes that there is no unobserved heterogeneity), the quantitative eect
on the estimates of moving to the four point model is inconsequential.
5.5 Is Selection Driving These Results?
One possible alternative explanation for improved traditional school achievement when a charter
school opens nearby is migration from the traditional school to the charter by lower performing
students. Three pieces of evidence, however, suggest that if anything, the opposite phenomenon
occurs in our sample: students switching from traditional to charter schools are above average
performers.
We rst look at within-school variation in achievement over time. Enrollment increases in
15For brevity, we present results only for models with 1 and 4 points of support. Full results are available from the
authors upon request.
13traditional schools within ten kilometers of a charter school were almost two percent less than
those in other traditional schools, suggesting that some migration from the traditional school to
the charter school occurs. Repeating this comparison for the percentages of students eligible for
free lunch and who are African-American, two populations with lower than average test scores, we
nd that relative sizes of these populations increase in traditional schools within ten kilometers of
a new charter. To the extent that these populations proxy for below-average scoring students, our
estimated gains to competition are in spite of, rather than a consequence of, a change in student
population.
Next we explore this issue using student-level data. Although we lack comprehensive individual
student tracking data necessary to follow all students longitudinally, we have once-lagged test scores
for all students contributing current scores. To examine the eect of attrition, we calculate the
average once-lagged score for each school-grade and test subject (math and reading), a measure
of previous year ability. For example, we obtain the average 1998{99 math score for all students
in school s, grade 4, in 1999{2000. If there is no systematic exiting from traditional schools, then
the change in the once-lagged score should be independent of whether a competing charter school
opens. That is, if low-performing students leave a traditional school for a new charter school in
1999{2000, then the change in average score from 1997{98 to 1998{99 for the students attending
the traditional school in 1998{99 and 1999{2000 should be greater than the corresponding change
for an otherwise identical school not facing new charter school competition.
This idea can be tested by estimating equation (9), where subscripts denote school (s), co-
hort (c), and time (t). As described above, LAGSCORE represents the once lagged performance
composite and COMPETE is a dummy for whether a charter school is located within 10 km.
Unobserved eects include time eects (t), school-cohort eects (s;c), and idiosyncratic school-
time-cohort eects ("c;s;t). Parameter  thus measures whether the change in the lagged score
diers by whether the school faced charter school competition. If lower scoring students switch
from traditional schools to competing charter schools, and the result is an increase in the observed
achievement, then  will be positive.
LAGSCOREs;c;t =  + t + COMPETEs;c;t + s;c + "s;c;t (9)
14Table 8 reports the estimates of equation (9) for all six cohorts that we can follow longitudinally.
Of the twelve cohort-subject pairs beginning with grade 3 in 1997{1998 and ending with grade 8
in 1998{1999 for both subjects (reading and math), only three experience a signicant change in
lagged test score, all of which are lower after the introduction of a charter school. This provides
evidence that above-average students are more likely to exit traditional schools for charters than
below-average students.
Finally, for those students that we are able to identify, we examine the performance of students
who switched from a traditional school to a charter.16 We nd that approximately 75 percent
of those who switched had a higher score than the average score in the traditional school the
year before they left. This is direct evidence that charter-induced growth in traditional school
performance is not a manifestation of an exodus of low-scoring students.
In sum, traditional schools experience net gains in performance despite a decrease in average
student quality (in some cohorts), suggesting that our estimated eects of charter school competi-
tion provide a lower bound for the true eect.
6 Conclusion
Using North Carolina data on charter school location and achievement test results, we explore the
eect of school choice on school quality. We nd traditional school achievement gains to charter
school competition across a wide set of models. Overall, the results imply an approximate one
percent increase in achievement when a traditional school faces competition from a charter school.
This increase represents approximately one quarter of the mean standard deviation of observed
gains, suggesting a considerable return to school choice.
Our results conict with Bettinger's (1999) nding that charter school competition has no
eect on traditional schools, but this dierence may be due to dierent pre-charter competitive
environments in North Carolina and Michigan. North Carolina has 117 independent traditional
school districts while Michigan has over 500. North Carolina school districts correspond roughly to
counties, so residents have less ability to exert Tiebout choice over their school districts. Michigan
16Identifying students who switch involves nding unique matches on test scores, race, gender, and birthdate. We
search for unique matches only within a county for those students who do not match within a school between years.
We can identify 2,140 students who switch from a traditional school to a charter school.
15parents, in contrast, have a much larger number of school districts within a small distance of their
residences.17
A caveat is that we make two sets of simplifying assumptions regarding school choice. First, we
ignore all non-charter school intra-system choices. For example, almost seventy percent of North
Carolina school districts oer some form of school choice such as intra-district transfers, magnets,
and year-round schools (North Carolina Oce of Lieutenant Governor, 2000). Combined with
private and alternative schools, and home-schooling, residents of most North Carolina counties have
some form of school choice, such as intra-district transfers, magnet schools, and year-round schools..
Ignoring these alternatives leads to an overestimate of the distance to the nearest competitor. The
direction of any resulting bias is not clear. However, if one interprets the results as the eect of
charter school choice, rather than school choice in general, then this problem is eliminated.
Second, we make some important assumptions about transferring into a charter school. Inter-
district transfers are allowed in the model. It is assumed that there are open seats in the charter
so that a threat to disenroll is credible. We also assume that the size of the charter has no eect
on the impact of competition, though it is possible that this impact will increase with size of the
charter.
Nevertheless, this paper adds to the literature on school competition using a simple model that
incorporates cost and quality and heretofore unanalyzed data. The results suggest important gains
in traditional school achievement due to the introduction and growth of charter school choice.
17For example, Kent County (Michigan) and Wake County (North Carolina) have similar populations and land
areas. Although Wake County has one (traditional) school district, Kent County has nineteen.
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Figure 1: North Carolina Charter Schools: 1997{2000









































Figure 2: Distribution of distance from nearest charter for schools with and without charters in the
same county.
21Table 1: Charter Schools in North Carolina
Total Public Charter School Percent of Public Charter Schools
Year Enrollment Enrollment Students in Charter in Operation
1997{1998 1,208,368 4,456 0.37% 28
1998{1999 1,229,929 8,183 0.67% 52
1999{2000 1,249,922 12,128 0.97% 74
2000{2001 1,268,406 14,899 1.17% 91
Source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction
22Table 2: Means of Distance Measures
Measure 1997{1998 1998{1999 1999{2000
Continuous
Distance (km) 32.036 27.322 21.426
Log (Distance) 3.180 2.970 2.698
Indicators
Within 5 km 0.093 0.142 0.193
Within 10 km 0.178 0.265 0.350
Within 15 km 0.272 0.366 0.480
Within 20 km 0.353 0.454 0.590
Within 25 km 0.425 0.539 0.694
Within County 0.329 0.464 0.570
23Table 3: Achievement of Traditional Schools
Performance Composite Increase from Previous Year
Year Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1996{1997 66.93 11.34
1997{1998 71.11 10.37 4.18 5.43
1998{1999 73.69 9.88 2.58 4.76
1999{2000 74.80 9.94 1.12 4.52
Source: North Carolina Department of Public Instruction
24Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev
Proportion of Students Hispanic 0.033 0.042
Proportion of Students Free Lunch Eligible 0.382 0.194
Proportion of Students African-American 0.319 0.247
Student-Faculty Ratio 15.216 2.438
Enrollment of School 566.564 229.276
Performance Composite 71.632 10.828
Log (Performance Composite) 4.273 0.163
25Table 5: Cross-Sectional IV Models
Year 1997{1998 1998{1999 1999{2000
Distance in km  4  10 5  2  10 4*  1  10 4
(8  10 5) (8  10 5) (8  10 5)
Log(Distance) -0.003 -0.002 -0.007**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Charter within 10 km 0.012* -0.002 0.018**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Charter within 20 km 0.012* 0.004 0.010**
(0.005) (0.004 ) (0.004)
Charter In County 0.013** 0.003 0.008*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 1,286 1,307 1,307
Dependent Variable: Log(Performance Composite)
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signicant at 5%; ** Signicant at 1%.
Each cell contains the parameter estimate on the distance measure from a regression using data
only from the indicated year with the corresponding distance variable as the only included distance
measure. Thus, the table reports an estimate for 3  5 = 15 regressions.
Other included regressors include the percent of the students that are African-American, Hispanic,
and free lunch eligible, the county population density, school enrollment, and the natural log of the
lagged performance score (instrumented by the natural log of the twice lagged score).
The sample size in 1997{98 is less than 1,307 due to missing data for the twice-lagged score.
26Table 6: Arellano-Bond IV Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log(Distance) -0.003
(0.003)
Charter within 5 kilometers 0.011
(0.006)
Charter within 10 kilometers 0.010
(0.005)
Charter within 15 kilometers 0.010
(0.005)
Charter within 20 kilometers 0.010
(0.004)
Charter within 25 kilometers 0.010
(0.004)
Charter in County 0.008
(0.004)
Log (Lagged Performance Composite) 0.415 0.634 0.637 0.638 0.638 0.635
(0.028) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Percent of Students Hispanic -0.246 -0.316 -0.314 -0.315 -0.311 -0.310 -0.310
(0.100) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
Percent of Students Free Lunch Eligible 0.066 0.119 0.118 0.119 0.120 0.119 0.118
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Percent of Students African-American -0.359 -0.381 -0.381 -0.379 -0.380 -0.380 -0.378
(0.046) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Student-Faculty Ratio -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.007 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 -0.035
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Standard errors in parentheses.
 Signicant at 5 %;
 Signicant at 1 %.
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Performance Composite)
N=1,307 in all regressions.
Models also include year indicators.
Each regression contains four years of data except for the rst column, which contains only three years because distance is innite in 1996{1997.
2
7Table 7: Maximum Likelihood Models
Points of Support
Distance 1 point 4 points
5 km 0.0106 0.0107
(0.0028) (0.0028)
10 km 0.0093 0.0089
(0.0024) (0.0024)
15 km 0.0067 0.0065
(0.0024) (0.0024)
20 km 0.0090 0.0088
(0.0023) (0.0024)
25 km 0.0055 0.0055
(0.0024) (0.0024)
Each cell represents a separate regression in which the given variable is the only distance indicator included.
N=1,307 schools in all cases.
: Signicant at 1 percent; : Signicant at 5 percent.
Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.
\Points of support" species the number of discrete points of heterogeneity specied in the model. \1 point" assumes
that there is no time-invariant heterogeneity.
Each model also includes the logarithm of the lagged performance composite, the proportion of the students that
are Hispanic, African-American, and free lunch eligible, student to faculty ratio, enrollment, the county population
density, and year indicators.






























Standard errors are in parentheses. Each cell contains the parameter estimate on \a charter within 10 kilometers"
indicator in a xed-eect average score regression that also includes year indicators. The samples are cohorts of
students over time. For example, the top panel follows those students in 7th grade in 1997-1998 to 8th grade 1998-
1999, the cohort is not observed the following year, because students are not observed after 8th grade. The second
row \6th grade 1997-1998" contains data for the three years 1997{1998 (6th grade), 1998{1999 (7th grade), and
1999{2000 (8th grade).
29